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Violence Research in Northeast and Southeast Asia: 
Main Themes and Directions
Oliver Hensengerth, School of Social Sciences – Politics and International Relations, University of Southampton, UK
The study analyses research on violence in the Northeast and Southeast Asia with respect to four types: political, urban, domestic and youth violence, high-
lighting current research themes, tendencies and gaps in violence research on and in the region, and identifying needs for further research. Commonalities and 
differences between countries and subregions are examined, along with a treatment of the colonial experience that influenced political violence in post-
colonial countries.
With the exception of political violence, violence in North-
east and Southeast Asia has been thoroughly understudied, 
particularly within the region.1 One obvious reason for this 
is that many countries have been governed by auth-
oritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes that applied 
political violence for the purpose of staying in power and 
had no intention of allowing independent research. Most 
research has therefore come from Western Europe, the 
United States, and particularly Australia.
For this reason, Australian and U.S. research institutes 
have also traditionally seen the presence of a large number 
of regional scholars. It is only in recent years, when most 
countries experienced some form of democratic opening 
between 1989 and 1999, that regional scholarship on viol-
ence has gained more prominence. Regional scholarship is 
unevenly spread across countries: six of the region’s fif-
teen countries have small or negligible research infra-
structure (Laos, Cambodia, Burma, East Timor, North 
Korea and Brunei). Of these, Laos, Cambodia, Burma and 
East Timor have all experienced several decades of inter-
nal violence.
The present paper has two purposes: First, it will detail the 
state of the art in violence research in Northeast and 
Southeast Asia. Second, it is designed to identify gaps in 
this research. The study analyses research on violence in the 
region with respect to four types: political, urban, domestic 
and youth violence. In order to examine the literature and 
to identify needs for further research, the paper highlights 
current research themes, tendencies and gaps in violence 
research on and in the region. This includes commonalities 
and differences between countries or subregions and an il-
lumination of the colonial experience that influenced 
political violence in post-colonial countries.
Violence research in Northeast and Southeast Asia has tra-
ditionally focussed on political violence, reflecting the viol-
ent history of most countries in the region after World War 
II. Most forms of political violence are discussed through 
the lens of post-colonial nation-building and therefore in 
relation to specific political contexts: ethno-religious viol-
ence, secessionism, and state violence to preserve national 
unity and government power; the ideological contest in the 
Second and Third Indochina Wars; and domestic conflicts, 
1 Northeast Asia comprises China, the Koreas, 
Japan, and Taiwan. Southeast Asia is subdivided into 
continental Southeast Asia (Burma, Thailand, Cam-
bodia, Laos, and Vietnam); and insular Southeast 
Asia (Malaysia, Indonesia, Timor-Leste, Brunei, and 
the Philippines).
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in the form of communist insurgencies, anti-communist 
counterinsurgencies, and generalised civil wars.
In contrast, youth, urban and domestic violence have only 
recently become part of the scientific discourse, whereby 
youth violence still plays a marginal role. Youth violence is 
discussed in connection with political events, such as the 
violence surrounding the independence of East Timor, and 
also against the backdrop of paternalistic societies in which 
youth join gangs in order to find a role for themselves in 
society. This latter context is also the frame for the dis-
course on domestic violence: paternalistic societies, in 
which women struggle to make themselves heard and in 
which judges and legislators often relegate wife abuse to the 
private sphere. In the cases of youth violence and domestic 
violence, the context of authoritarian paternalistic societies 
meant that researchers neglected the issue until liberalising 
tendencies during the last two decades, which have allowed 
the emergence of a body of literature that is still thin for 
youth violence but already sizeable for domestic violence. 
Urban violence has also only lately made it onto the re-
search agenda, given the low levels of economic devel-
opment and urbanisation in many countries in the region.
The paper begins with an overview over the colonial his-
tories of the countries in the region. These histories are 
linked to forms of political violence. It is therefore the aim 
of the history part to highlight causes of political violence 
as inherent in the colonial experience. Political violence is 
analysed along three lines: identity and sovereignty in bor-
derlands, ethno-religious and communal violence, and viol-
ence perpetrated by authoritarian governments that exclude 
the wider population from access to resources through elite 
political processes. The sections that follow discuss causes 
and risk factors for urban, domestic and youth violence. A 
conclusion will synthesise the main points of analysis and 
outline potentials for future research.
1. Historical Introduction
Summarising the history of Northeast and Southeast Asia is 
no easy matter, due to the immense political, economic, 
cultural and social diversity between and within the coun-
tries. Most crucially, all countries except Thailand, the Ko-
reas and Japan were colonised;2 China was a semi-colony 
whose own imperial government remained in power, but 
where Western imperialism carved out spheres of influence.
1.1. The Impact of Colonialism on Current Conflict Patterns
While colonialism had a profound political, social and 
economic impact on some colonies, life in other societies 
continued almost uninterrupted. Laos, Cambodia and East 
Timor were relatively unaffected by colonialism, with their 
agrarian societies and autonomous villages remaining 
largely intact. In these territories, it was post-colonial devel-
opments, rather than the colonial experience, that triggered 
political and social conflicts. These countries had not ex-
perienced strong, penetrative centralized bureaucracies 
prior to colonialism, and colonialism did nothing to change 
that. We will return to this point later. In other countries, 
colonialism firmly took hold, as the ruling powers con-
structed empires that required efficient administration and 
large-scale infrastructure (such as road and rail networks 
and deep-water ports) for the extraction and shipping of 
resources on a mass scale to fuel European industrialisation.
Colonialism had a variety of impacts on these places. First, 
it created new countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Phil-
ippines. The Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 drew an artificial 
line through the Malay archipelago to settle the hostilities 
between the British and Dutch. The creation of Indonesia 
from the Dutch colony is largely responsible for the seces-
sionist conflicts in Aceh and Papua. When Sukarno became 
the first Indonesian president in 1949, he attempted to cre-
ate a nation-state that included all of the Dutch East Indies 
under the slogan “From Sabang to Marauke”. Aceh and 
Papua resisted post-colonial incorporation into an Indone-
sian nation through their respective independence move-
ments: the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) was established in 
1976 and the Free Papua Movement (OPM) in 1965. Aceh 
was an independent sultanate colonised by the Dutch in 
1873. After Indonesian independence it was merged with 
North Sumatra despite its insistence that it was ethnically 
2 Japan annexed Korea in 1910 and colonised Thai -
land during World War II.
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and religiously distinct from the other tribal groups in the 
area. As for Papua, the Dutch stayed in the small territory 
and created a statist entity independent from events in In-
donesia, where Papuans were employed in the civil service 
and the army. The Dutch withdrew in 1963 under pressure 
from U.S. President Kennedy, whose administration 
warned that a military conflict between the Netherlands 
and Indonesia would ultimately benefit the communists in 
Indonesia (Lintner 2009b; Webster 2007).
As for Malaysia, the area consisted of small sultanates in 
pre-colonial times. British colonialism not only put an end 
to this political diversity, it greatly changed the ethnic com-
position of the area when the British encouraged mass In-
dian and Chinese immigration. Although Indian and 
Chinese traders had been present in the area long before 
British colonialism arrived, mass migration occurred be-
tween 1786 (when Britain took possession of Peneng) and 
1957 (when Malaysia became independent). The peak of 
Indian and Chinese migration was in the second half of the 
nineteenth century when the establishment of rubber and 
coffee plantations created the need for large amounts of la-
bour. The British authorities brought Indians from British 
India and negotiated the transfer of Chinese workers with 
the Chinese government. Both Chinese and Indians came 
initially as indentured labourers. Some Indians came to 
Malaya accompanying the British from India as domestic 
servants or in other functions. The early twentieth century 
then saw Indian migration in higher occupational cat-
egories, such as doctors and lawyers (Sandhu 1969; Peri-
asamy 2007; Arasaratnam 1979). As a consequence of 
Indian and Chinese concentration on business, these two 
ethnic groups came to dominate economic life. British pre-
independence plans to grant citizenship to Indians and 
Chinese resulted in mass protests by the United Malays 
National Organisation (UMNO), which became the domi-
nant political party after independence. In order to achieve 
an accommodation between the ethnic groups, the British 
formed the Malay Chinese Association, which was mostly 
active among Malay Chinese, as a non-communist alter-
native to the Malay Communist Party. The Malayan Indian 
Congress agreed to join a coalition with UMNO and the 
Malay Chinese Association. This gave birth to the Barisan 
Nasional alliance, which came to dominate politics in Ma-
laysia after independence.
As a result of immigration, Indians make up roughly 7 per-
cent of Malaysia’s population, Chinese almost 24 percent. 
Malays and other indigenous peoples make up only 
roughly 60 percent of the population of modern Malaysia. 
The relative economic success of Malay Chinese and Malay 
Indians in comparison to the indigenous population led to 
the race riots of 1969, which led the government to intro-
duce affirmative action in employment and education 
(Chakravarti and Roslan 2005; Balasubramaniam 2006).
The Philippines were made up of a number of seafaring 
states that were at times part of the Malay kingdoms of 
Srivijaya, Majapahit and Brunei. The legacy of the Spanish, 
Dutch and British empires here is still the root of territorial 
conflicts between Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Brunei. The imposition of Spanish colonialism on the is-
land group created the modern state of the Philippines. It 
also created a class of commercially oriented landowners, 
caciques, who were mostly Chinese mestizos.3 In the ab-
sence of an indigenous aristocracy and bureaucracy the ca-
ciques became the Philippines’ economic elite by the latter 
half of the nineteenth century. When the United States 
took over the Spanish colony in 1898 and moved to create a 
political system modelled on the U.S. presidential system, 
the  cacique families came to dominate the political in-
stitutions from the localities to the central level. This gave 
rise to the characterisation of Filipino democracy as “ca-
cique democracy” (Anderson 1988), indicating the domi-
nation of parliament and government by landowning 
families. Virtually all Filipino presidents since indepen-
dence in 1946 came from landowning families, including 
post-Marcos President Corazon Aquino (1986–1992), 
President Gloria Macapagal-Aroyo (2001–2010), and the 
current President Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino, son of ex-
president Corazon Aquino and assassinated senator Be-
nigno “Ninoy” Aquino.
3 For a history of the Chinese in the Philippines see 
Wickberg 1964.
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The Muslim population of Mindanao, collectively known as 
Moro since Spanish colonial times but consisting of diverse 
linguistic and cultural groups, resisted both colonial domi-
nation and inclusion into the post-colonial state. Spanish 
rule converted most Filipinos to Roman Catholicism, thus 
creating a religious element in the Mindanao struggle 
against domination by the north. While the Spanish had 
never fully subjugated the Muslim population, U.S. policies 
eventually managed to do that, using land laws that enour-
aged Christian Filipino migration and the establishment of 
plantations by U.S. and Filipino companies. Continued dis-
criminatory policies in the post-colonial Philippines, in-
cluding migration into Muslim areas, sparked an 
insurgency against the government in Manila in the 1960s 
(McKenna 1998; McKenna 2007; Concepcion et. al. 2003). 
The conflict remains unresolved to the present day. 
The second impact of colonialism, which is related to the 
creation of entirely new countries, is the imposition of the 
nation-state ideal in countries that were previously govern-
ed by traditional concepts of kingship. This created new 
problems of ethno-nationalism as new forms of national 
narrative developed and the new ethnic minorities resisted 
the new hierarchical patterns of domination in the nation-
state. Conflicts erupted in Indonesia with Aceh and Papua, 
and in the Philippines with the Mindanao Muslims, as 
post-colonial governments attempted to extend their reach 
by force into minority areas. But also in the old kingdom of 
Burma, ethnic groups such as the Karen and the Kachin 
suddenly found themselves in conflict with a new govern-
ment that sought their forcible subjugation to a Burmese 
state (Rajah 2002; Kuroiwa and Verkuyten 2008). And in 
Thailand, the Malay majority of the southern provinces re-
sisted economic marginalisation and neglect by Bangkok. 
All these issues remain unresolved.
The third impact of colonialism was the temporary sus-
pension of pre-colonial conflicts between the ancient states 
of Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, which broke 
out again after independence. The conflicts in this area 
stem largely from the succession of great empires: Khmer, 
Vietnamese and Thai. At the time when the French colon-
ised Indochina, the Siamese and Vietnamese kingdoms had 
come to dominate large areas that had been under the con-
trol of a powerful Khmer kingdom during the Angkor peri-
od (802–1431). By the time the French arrived, Cambodia 
was already much reduced and the Angkor cities and 
temples lay in ruins in the forests. Restoration efforts began 
in the late-nineteenth century by the École Francaise d’Ex-
treme Orient, that is, on the initiative of the French colo-
nial power. After independence, the Angkor period became 
a major source of Cambodian nationalism.
The French advance stopped the Thai and Vietnamese 
states encroaching on Cambodian territory and thus effec-
tively rescued Cambodia from disappearing. The unsolved 
issues are still visible today in the ongoing political and 
sometimes military conflict between Cambodia and Thail-
and over the Preah Vihear temple at the Thai-Cambodian 
border. The temple, built during the Angkor period, has 
been a source of conflict between the two countries since 
1962, when a ruling by the International Court of Justice in 
The Hague asserted that the temple was on the Cambodian 
side of the border. The dispute stems from the cession of 
Thai territory to the French protectorate of Cambodia and 
the demarcation of the Siamese-Cambodian border in 
1907, when the French survey team placed the temple on 
the Cambodian side of the border in contravention of an 
agreement that the border follow the watershed in the 
Dang Raek mountains. In 1954, Cambodia complained to 
the International Court of Justice after Thailand invaded 
the border area (Prescott 1996). Another military border 
conflict was sparked in 2008, when the temple was named a 
UNESCO World Heritage site. In 2011, Indonesia agreed to 
negotiate in the conflict. Similarly, Cambodia and Vietnam 
are at odds over the Mekong Delta region, a formerly Cam-
bodian territory but ceded to Vietnam under French colo-
nialism. The Mekong Delta area is still referred to in 
Cambodia as Kampuchea Krom, or Lower Cambodia.
The fourth impact of colonialism consisted in the 
 introduction of new means of mass production (rubber 
plantations, tin mining, etc.) during European industrial-
isation, which created a proletariat. In Vietnam, for in-
stance, economic changes attached Vietnam’s economy to 
the international market. This development precipitated 
profound social changes. In the villages, the extension of 
French control manifested itself in the introduction of a 
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pervasive money economy, enforced tax collection, private 
property and agricultural production for the market (espe-
cially rice). These economic processes replaced the com-
munal village organisation, village autonomy, subsistence 
farming, and the widespread acceptance of taxes in kind. 
As a result, peasants were not only forced into commer-
cialized relationships under market conditions (replacing 
communal supra-familial institutions); events such as loan 
default, a drop in market prices, or a bad harvest could 
make subsistence farmers landless or turn them into poor 
peasants, tenants, or agricultural laborers (Chesneaux 
1955; Ngo 1991).
In the urban areas, colonial industrialisation led to the 
emergence of an industrial proletariat that grew strongly 
during World War I due to France’s need for raw materials, 
and continued to grow after the war, reaching its maximum 
in 1929 in the fields of commerce and industry, plantation 
agriculture, and mining (McAlister 1969). The proletariat 
was joined by landless subsistence farmers who moved to 
the cities as migrant workers in search of employment 
(Chesneuax 1955; Karnow 1991). The urban areas also saw 
the rise of an indigenous bourgeoisie, composed of ab-
sentee landlords, entrepreneurs and colonial officials, and a 
petit bourgeoisie composed of shopkeepers, small traders, 
artisans, clerks, managers, interpreters, primary school 
teachers, journalists, and technicians (Marr 1984).
The emergence of new social classes spurred by industrial-
isation and agro-industrial development occurred across 
the colonies with the exception of Laos, Cambodia and 
East Timor; in the Philippines the economy continued to 
be dominated by the indigenous cacique class. The appear-
ance of new social classes was accompanied during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century by radicalising – 
but nevertheless factionalised – independence movements. 
During the nineteenth century, members of the indigenous 
elite began to advocate reform of political and education 
systems (for example the One Hundred Days Reform 
Movement in China or the Young Men’s Buddhist As-
sociation in Burma). The aim was a cultural revival and a 
strengthening of political and social institutions vis-à-vis 
the colonialists. However, the ineffectiveness of the reform-
ers due to the inertia of conservative forces and the heavy-
handed response of the colonialists gave rise to more 
radical ideas of anti-colonial struggle and revolution in-
formed by readings of a cross-section of Western political 
philosophy (Cady 1958, 168–72; Fleischmann 1989, 1–3; 
Htin Aung Maung 1967, 268–83; Lintner 1990, 5; Smith 
1993, 49–57; Trager 1966, 169; Thompson and Adloff 1950, 
82–83; Harrison 2001).
The end of World War I marked a watershed, when it tran-
spired that Woodrow Wilson’s ideas of self-determination 
did not apply to the colonies. In China, for example, the 
German enclave of Shandong was handed over to Japan 
rather than returned to China. In the eyes of those ad-
vocating radical changes, this discredited not only domestic 
reformists and the old social classes, but also the demo-
cratic and capitalist countries. At the same time, the success 
of the Russian Revolution provided a direct template for 
changes reaching far beyond mere reforms.4 The crisis of 
the world economy in the late 1920s greatly magnified both 
anti-colonial sentiment and the attraction of communism. 
The formation of unions and political parties (especially 
social democratic and communist) lent a structure. Con-
certed action began, including boycotts of Western pro-
ducts and strikes.
Communist parties had a major impact on all post-
colonial countries including especially China. In 1949, the 
communist party under Mao won the civil war against the 
nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek. While Chiang re-
treated to Taiwan, wiped out the local political elite in 
bloody purges, and erected a military dictatorship that 
lasted until 1987, mainland China became communist. 
After a period of economic recovery it plunged into the 
Great Leap Forward (1958–1960) followed by the violence 
and upheaval of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 
(1966–1976) (Gao 2008), after which it set out to im-
plement major economic reforms, which have brought 
strong economic growth rates since the 1980s.
4 For more detail see Marr (1981), Harrison (2001), 
van de Ven (2003), and Thornton (2007).
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The Potsdam Conference in 1945 divided Korea at along 
the 38th parallel into a communist North and a capitalist 
South. In South Korea, U.S. occupation led to the sup-
pression of the radical labour movement and the rural in-
surgency. Under American sponsorship, Syngman Rhee 
became South Korea’s first post-war president. While no-
minally democratic, Rhee was authoritarian as well as cor-
rupt, and Korea experienced a period of political instability 
which ended only with the military coup led by Park 
Chung-hee in 1961. While economically extremely success-
ful, Park established a brutal anti-communist regime which 
oversaw Korea’s transformation into an industrialised state 
harnessing economies of scale in shipbuilding, car-making, 
heavy engineering and chemicals. Later, South Korea 
moved into high-technology industries such as semicon-
ductors. Park was assassinated in 1979, but military rule 
continued until 1987, when South Korea embarked on de-
mocratisation at a time when economic success began to 
falter and a civil society began to emerge.5
Cambodia became independent in 1954, and was led Noro-
dom Sihanouk whose officially neutral and nominally de-
mocratic regime showed its true authoritarian nature in 
repressing any challenges to his rule. This eroded the de-
mocratic institutions that had been half-heartedly intro-
duced by the French colonial authorities and increasing 
repression forced the communists underground.
In 1968, the communists embarked on a nation-wide in-
surgency, which was the beginning of the Cambodian crisis 
that was to last until 1991. In addition, the army leadership 
under Lon Nol detested Sihanouk’s neutral foreign policy 
and his refusal to take part in the Vietnam War. In 1970, 
the army under Lon Nol toppled Sihanouk, supported by 
the United States. The Lon Nol government was initially 
welcomed by the urban elite as a respite from the cor-
ruption and repression of the Sihanouk regime.
However, Lon Nol proved to be highly corrupt as well. In 
addition, the army campaign against the communist insur-
gency in combination with U.S. carpet bombing of Cambo-
dian territory used by the North Vietnamese army led to 
mass flight to the cities, particularly Phnom Penh where the 
population rose from 600,000 in 1969 to 3 million in 1975. 
The army campaign against the insurgency proved futile, 
however. Unable to fend off the communists and sustained 
only by U.S. military assistance, the Lon Nol government 
was expelled by the communists led by Pol Pot in 1975.
Pol Pot erected a radically anti-Vietnamese communist 
state modelled on Maoist principles that was to last until 
1979. Vietnam regarded constant border violations as a se-
curity risk, and in 1979 intervened and ousted Pol Pot. His 
regime fled to the Thai border, and the civil war that en-
sued between the new government and Pol Pot’s forces 
dragged on until 1991 when it was ended by the inter-
vention of a UN peacekeeping force.6
In Burma, independent since 1948, the government was 
challenged by a communist insurgency that was made 
worse by ethnic conflict. After a phase of unstable liberal 
democracy, the civilian government handed power to a 
military caretaker regime in 1958. When instability con-
tinued after the restoration of civilian rule in 1960, the mili-
tary took over completely in 1962. In November 2010, 
general elections were held to institute a shift from military 
to civilian rule. However, political parties linked with the 
military, reserved seats for the military in the new parlia-
ment, and the ban preventing Aung San Suu Kyi from par-
ticipating in the elections put a question mark over the 
sincerity of the military’s intention to introduce democracy.
In Indonesia, independent since 1949, President Sukarno 
had to balance two domestic political forces: the commu-
nist party and the military. This produced political in-
stability, exacerbated by a faltering economy and ethnic 
conflict. In 1965, the military blamed an attempted coup 
on the communist party and organised a hunt for real and 
alleged communists that led to mass killing of suspected 
communists.
5 For South Korea’s development see Amsden 
(1989), C. Lee (1992), Cho (1994), and Yeon-Ho Lee 
(1996).
6 For a history of the Cambodia conflict see for ex-
ample Chandler (2008) and Hood and Ablin (1987).
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In 1967, Suharto toppled Sukarno, became president, and 
established his New Order regime that pursued capitalist 
expansion and institutionalised a political role for the mili-
tary under the dwi fungsi doctrine.7 In the following peri-
od, Suharto created a wide patronage network with the 
economic elite that profited from exploiting resources, such 
as timber from the forests in West Kalimantan and Borneo. 
His rule was sustained by criminal and paramilitary groups 
that acted on the state’s behalf, in a process which normal-
ised violence and criminality as state practice (Wilson 
2006). The collapse of the Suharto regime in the wake of 
the Asian financial crisis of 1997 produced a power vacuum 
that would lead to communal and anti-Chinese violence.
In the Philippines, a communist insurgency began in the 
1960s against the U.S.-leaning regime of President Marcos 
when the Communist Party of the Philippines formed its 
guerrilla army, the New People’s Army. The insurgency co-
incided with the revival of the independence struggle of the 
Mindanao Muslims. In 1972, President Marcos declared 
martial law and in 1973 assumed absolute powers. In 1986, 
he was toppled after broad mass protests led by Corazon 
Aquino, who reinstated democratic rule.
In Malaysia, the Malayan Communist Party was outlawed 
and defeated by the British authorities in the Malayan 
Emergency of 1948–1960.
2. Themes in Regional Violence Research
2.1. Political Violence
Today, Japan and South Korea are the only countries in the 
region that are free from political violence. For the others, 
contemporary discourses on political violence can be 
grouped into three categories: first, the problem of state 
sovereignty in borderlands inhabited by minorities where 
the identity conflict is often also a secessionist conflict or 
one seeking autonomy from the central government 
(Burma, China, Indonesia including East Timor and Thail-
and). The second category encompasses ethno-religious vi-
olence and communal conflicts not involving demands for 
autonomy or secession (Malaysia, Indonesia, East Timor). 
Both of these categories have direct links to the colonial 
past through the colonial project of creating state and 
nation-state (Jemadu 2004; for a general overview see Yeung 
2002). They are also interlinked as they both relate to re-
gime survival and territorial integrity in multi-ethnic states. 
The analysis will therefore cross over to touch on other 
causes of conflict where necessary. The third category con-
sists of specific forms of political system and types of state – 
neopatrimonialism and so-called predatory states – and 
their links to particular forms of state-sponsored violence.
2.1.1. Borderlands and Rim Provinces: Problems of Sovereignty and Identity
As a result of an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to inte-
grate ethnically disparate territories into a single colony, 
Indonesia has been riven by ethnic, religious and regional 
tensions that produced political and economic instability.
In West Papua, different visions of community, state and 
nation clashed during decolonisation and the early years of 
nation-building after independence. Sukarno’s civic con-
cept of nation-building failed to take into account West 
Papua’s ethnic diversity that was employed by the ethno-
cultural variant of nation-building in Malaysia in 1963 
when Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah were integrated into 
the Federation of Malaya to form Malaysia (Kreuzer 2006; 
Kreuzer and Weiberg 2005, 6–9 and 27–37; Kirksey 
and Roemajauw 2002; for Islam in Malaysia see Teik 2006).
In Aceh, the conflict between the central government in 
Jakarta and the region of Aceh also dates back to Dutch co-
lonial rule. After Indonesian independence, Aceh was de-
nied the autonomy it hoped for, sparking Muslim-led 
rebellions. Autonomy was finally granted in 2005 in the 
wake of the December 2004 tsunami. After autonomy, Aceh 
introduced Shariah law in a development that pushed aside 
moderate Muslims in the province. As a consequence, the 
literature on Aceh focusses on the role of Islam and the re-
lationship between Islam and nationalism (Barter 2010; 
Aspinall 2007).
7 Anderson 2001; for the capitalist development of 
Indonesia under Suharto see Farid 2005; for the 
issue of political rehabilitation in post-Suharto In-
donesia of those imprisoned as alleged communists 
in 1965 see McGregor and Hearman 2007.
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The conflict with East Timor has its roots in Portuguese 
decolonisation, which set in after the Portuguese Car-
nation Revolution of 1974. When Portugal withdrew from 
East Timor, Indonesia occupied the territory and inte-
grated it into the Indonesian state. This sparked an insur-
gency that was to last until 1999 when Indonesia allowed 
a referendum to be held over the future political status of 
East Timor. This caught international attention when 
pro-Indonesian militias and the Indonesian military ter-
rorised the local population before the referendum vote. 
Since independence, East Timor has been a weak state and 
has seen successive UN missions sent to stabilise the 
country (see section 2.1.2. Ethno-religious and Com-
munal Violence).
The fact that Aceh and East Timor gained autonomy and 
independence respectively made them the focal point of re-
search regarding the secessionist conflicts in Indonesia. In 
contrast, West Papua has received little attention.
Thailand, too, has seen secessionist conflicts. In Buddhist 
Thailand, the southern provinces of Yala, Pattani, Nar-
athiwat, and Satun have Muslim majorities. The conflict 
began after World War II as part of the Malay national lib-
eration struggle (Wattana 2006). It is therefore a conflict 
between the Malay-Muslim south and the Buddhist central 
government. A famous rebellion occurred in 1948, when 
Malay-Muslim villagers clashed with Thai security forces 
(Satha-Anand 2006). The conflict owes its existence to “re-
ligious, cultural, economic, and political causes such as cul-
tural discrimination, relative economic deprivation, and 
political alienation” (Croissant 2007).
Among the Thai Muslim population feelings of disenfran-
chisement from political decision-making processes and 
religious discrimination by the Buddhist-dominated cen-
tral government are prevalent. The increasing intensity and 
radicalisation since 2004 is fuelled by two parallel devel-
opments: First, a radicalisation of Muslim ideology at 
home and abroad that draws on the failure of past secular-
ist development projects and is increasingly dividing mod-
erate and radical Muslims (Jitpiromsri,and Panyasak 2006; 
Wattana 2006). International terrorist networks are sus-
pected of involvement in the 2004 attacks, but there is no 
hard evidence (Liow 2004). The second factor is changes in 
intra-Thai political dynamics (McCargo 2006; Croissant 
2007).
McCargo shows that the relative peace in southern Thail-
and during the two decades leading up to 2004 was upset 
by the anti-royalist Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. 
Believing that the south was controlled by monarchist 
forces loyal to the palace – an idea called network mon-
archy – he upset this balance and unleashed a renewed in-
surgency (McCargo 2006). The monarchists struck back, 
however, forcing Thaksin to make concessions to the separ-
atists (convening a National Reconciliation Commission), 
and shortly afterwards removed him from power in the 
2006 coup. As a result of this escalation in the south and 
between Thai royalist and anti-royalist elites, experts pre-
dict a deepening of rifts in Thai society and an erosion of 
liberal democracy toward a semi-democratic, one-party re-
gime (Pathmanand 2006; Croissant 2007).
A third country beset with secessionism is the Philippines. 
In the south, Mindanao is home to a Muslim minority in a 
predominantly Catholic country. The largest armed insur-
gency movement is the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. A 
second Muslim separatist group is the Moro National Lib-
eration Front. The most militant, however, is Abu Sayyaf, a 
fundamentalist group that split from the Moro National 
Liberation Front. Abu Sayyaf is suspected of maintaining 
links with al-Qaeda. The Moro groups are suspected of 
having links to the Indonesian terror group Jemaah Isla-
miah, which has training camps in the Philippines and also 
is suspected to have links to al-Qaeda (Ressa 2003).
Having resisted integration into the colony since Spanish 
times, Muslim groups greeted the independent republic of 
1946 with suspicion. Filipino Muslims continued to resist 
political domination by Manila, leading to widespread 
conflict (Collier 2005; Kreuzer and Weiberg 2005, 10–18). 
At the time of Filipino independence, the stereotype of 
the southern Muslim Moros as backward was firmly held 
by Christian Filipinos. In addition, the government con-
tinues to encourage Christian immigration into Minda-
nao, leading to feelings of marginalisation among 
Muslims (Turner 2003).
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The conflict in Mindanao has more facets than simply rebel 
groups fighting against central government domination. 
Mindanao is beset with clan feuds and inter-ethnic conflict, 
producing a highly complex landscape of violent central-
local and inter-local conflicts (Torres 2007). Even more 
complexity is injected by the insurgency of the New People’s 
Army, the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Phil-
ippines-National Democratic Front. In addition, guerillas 
who leave the underground pass their networks and skills 
on to a number of other actors: some are employed by local 
strongmen and the military; others join NGOs and cam-
paign for better access to resources for the poor. This 
changes the provincial power distribution between state, 
local strongmen, and local society (Rutten 2001).
Burma, too, has been shaken by ethnic violence. The focus 
of the violence discourse is on the government’s relations 
with the ethnic minorities, particularly the Wa, Shan and 
Karen. The conflict is a direct result of British colonial rule 
and the imposition of the nation-state ideal on an eth-
nically diverse entity. When Burma became independent in 
1948, minority insurgencies such as those of the Karen 
produced a highly unstable political environment as they 
resisted central rule from Rangoon and integration into the 
new polity (Wee and Lang 2006).
Since the military regime took over in a national emerg-
ency in 1962, it has fought against the minorities that oc-
cupy the border lands in its drive to implement the official 
policy of “non-disintegration of the union, non-dis-
integration of national solidarity, and perpetuation of 
national solidarity.” The Shan and the Karen in particular 
have put up much of the resistance against the military 
government. Research is looking into how the government 
dominates civilian life in the minority and majority areas 
through the destruction of homes, villages and means of 
livelihood, and the resistance that this provokes (Hudson-
Rodd and Hunt 2005).
The Karen in particular have been constructing a national 
narrative across their linguistic and religious subgroups. 
Having experienced a separate education system and 
Christian missionary exposure during colonial times, the 
Karen have established a narrative that sets them apart as a 
nation from the Union of Myanmar (Bryant 1997; Kuroiwa 
and Verkuyten 2008; Rajah 2002). The Karen traded teak 
with the British during colonial times, and use of forests 
was important in Karen identity. After independence, war 
broke out between the Karen and the Burmese army, and 
the illegal teak trade provided an important source of in-
come for the Karen armed forces. From this point on the 
military government in Burma set out to destroy the forest, 
in an attack on both Karen income and also the Karen 
identity and livelihood which were intimately linked with 
forestry (Horstmann 2004).
The Karen are politically split, with the Democratic Karen 
Buddhist Army having separated from the Karen National 
Union and siding with the military government. However, 
a splinter group of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army, 
Brigade 5, engaged in a military confrontation with the 
Burmese army one day after the national elections of 7 
November 2010 to voice their opposition against the gov-
ernment plan to consolidate ethnic minority armies into a 
centrally controlled border force (BBC News 2010). Fight-
ing between the Karen National Union and the Burmese 
army had already erupted earlier in 2010 over the govern-
ment’s border patrol plans.
Other studies look not at processes of political control 
themselves, but specifically at the government’s human 
rights abuses that are inherent to these processes of con-
trol. Here, the ethnic minorities, especially the Shan, and 
their subjugation to means of control such as forced popu-
lation transfers, are often the subject of research (Beyrer 
2001). As the Shan and other ethnic minorities occupy 
Burma’s border areas, research also explores the trans-
national dimension of the refugee issue and the civil con-
flict as a contributing factor for the trafficking of Shan 
women and girls into prostitution (Beyrer 2001).
China with its unruly provinces of Tibet and Xinjiang 
stands somewhat apart from these ethnic conflicts. Having 
been incorporated into the Chinese polity under the Qing 
Dynasty long before Western colonialism arrived in China, 
the provinces of Tibet and Xinjiang have since proven dif-
ficult to control for the central government in Beijing. 
Studies here focus mostly on how China attempts to draw 
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Tibet into the mainstream of Chinese modernisation, 
which has sparked a number of atheism campaigns (to 
diminish the social and political influence of Buddhism) 
and violent suppression of demonstrations (Matou 2005).
For Xinjiang, studies focus on rebellions by the Muslim 
Uighurs sparked by feelings of racial discrimination by the 
majority Han population, the Chinese government’s sup-
pression of Uighur nationalism, and issues of Uighur iden-
tity (Petersen 2006; Hyer 2006). The conflict in Xinjiang is 
thought to be exacerbated by contact between radical Uig-
hurs and militant Islamists in neighbouring Pakistan – es-
pecially the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) 
(Vicziany 2003; Haider 2005).
2.1.2. Ethno-religious and Communal Violence
In Indonesia, the financial crisis of 1998 ended the Suharto 
regime as criticism increased over the regime’s handling of 
the economic downturn. In May 1998, riots broke out ac-
ross Indonesia, often targeting the Indonesian Chinese, 
who were blamed for the economic crisis. The riots were 
reportedly instigated by the military and police, some of 
whose members took part in the rioting wearing plain 
clothes. During the riots, ethnic Chinese were hunted 
down and killed (Purdey 2006).8 Suharto was forced to re-
sign on May 21. In other parts of Indonesia, especially in 
the outer islands, ethno-religious violence broke out, most 
prominently in the Maluku islands, North, Central and 
South Sulawesi, and Central and West Kalimantan. The 
conflicts were compounded by difficult ethnic relations be-
tween Indonesia’s minorities and the Javanese majority 
population, and by the promotion of “Javaneseness” (Sut-
arto 2006; Coppel 2006).9 Secessionist conflicts in Aceh, 
West Papua and East Timor gained new strength.
The end of Suharto’s rule created a power vacuum. The pa-
tronage networks that had underpinned his government 
fragmented, and the criminal and paramilitary groups were 
no longer controlled by the central government. While this 
reduced central government-sponsored violence, violence 
by private vigilantes and paramilitary groups increased. 
Group identification was often based on religion and eth-
nicity at a time when the state was perceived as having 
failed in the provision of essential services such as security 
and employment (Nursalim 2003; Wilson 2006). In ad-
dition, government associations with the criminal under-
world and militias partly shifted from central government 
to local governments, leading to the criminalisation of 
everyday Indonesian politics at the local level (Bertrand 
2004; also Hadiz 2003).
In Jakarta and other cities, the Chinese community again 
confronted the debate between assimilation and integration 
and the definition of their identity in Indonesia. This de-
bate had raged among the Indonesian Chinese in the 1950s 
and 1960s, but was violently terminated by the 1965 coup 
and Suharto’s subsequent assumption of power in 1967 
(Purdey 2003; Turner 2003; Turner and Allen 2007).
Regarding the non-secessionist conflicts, researchers have 
looked into various issues that re-emerged when the cen-
tral government’s strong grip on power suddenly dis-
integrated. What all of these debates have in common is a 
focus on the re-shaping of community identities. The ma-
jority of studies on post-Suharto communal violence warn 
that these conflicts need to be located and understood in 
their context of colonial and post-colonial modernisation 
and capitalist expansion in order to understand their dy-
namics (Adams 2006, 194, 193–208 citing Sidel 2001, 48, 
and Bubandt 2001, 228; Colombijn and Lindblad 2002; 
Thorburn 2005; Azca 2005; van Klinken 2007; Wilson 
2008). These conflicts have their roots in old animosities 
between ethnic or religious groups, grievances produced by 
Suharto and his cronies, or migration of ethnic groups to 
new areas (Arifianto 2009).
In North Sulawesi, conflict occurred between the local 
population and internally displaced people who had fled 
the violence that broke out in North Maluku in 1999. This 
conflict is therefore one between the original population 
8 For a deeper discussion of the ethnic Chinese in 
Indonesia see Lindsey and Pausacker (2005).
9 For details on colonial policies in the Dutch East 
Indies concerning the Indonesian provinces on Bor-
neo see Wadley (2001). For the ethnic gang violence 
in relation to the Betawi community in Jakarta see 
Brown and Wilson (2007) and Bertrand (2008).
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and roughly 35,000 internally displaced persons. The ef-
fects of the influx of refugees included falling wages and 
rising housing costs, which led to conflicts. In addition, aid 
for the refugees caused suspicion and jealousy among the 
North Sulawesi people. Civil servants and members of the 
local population treated the arrivals with distrust and hos-
tility (Duncan 2005).
Central Sulawesi was shaken by Christian-Muslim conflict 
from 1998 to 2001. Although since then the violence has 
not reached the levels of the post-Suharto period, it does 
still break out occasionally. Decentralisation programmes 
in post-Suharto Indonesia led to political tensions between 
local elites as central government appointees for the re-
gions were replaced by directly elected local politicians. An 
increase in the number of positions in the newly estab-
lished legislatures and offices led to political rivalry.10 De-
centralisation involved redrawing administrative 
boundaries, leading to increased ethno-religious segre-
gation, and voting has also opened up new conflicts as vot-
ing voting behaviour may now mirror different group 
identities (Diprose 2008).
During the 1998–2001 conflict, militias emerged up on 
both sides, Christian and Muslim, in a development where 
local residents were drawn into the conflict leading to dis-
trict-wide riots. In fact, the roots of the power struggle are 
not religious but result from a combination of the legacy of 
policies under Dutch colonialism, power struggles between 
local elites and security forces, migration of settlers from 
Java and Bali, resulting competition for farmland between 
new arrivals and the indigenous population, and resource 
extraction (Davidson 2003; Aspinall and Berger 2001; Ari-
fianto 2009).
In Central Kalimantan, conflict erupted in 1996 over long-
standing grievances between Madurese migrants and the 
indigenous Dayaks. The conflict was mostly over land and 
was exacerbated by political competition during the decen-
tralisation programmes, leading to mass killings in 2001 
(Bouvier and Smith 2006). In West Kalimantan, mean-
while, the rubber plantations and timber forests had been 
part of identity construction between Dayak, Malays, and 
Chinese in colonial and post-colonial times. When state in-
stitutions were in disarray after the overthrow of Suharto, a 
realignment of ethnic relations occurred as different 
groups exploited the power vacuum to gain control over 
natural resources, particularly timber, which had been part 
of a thriving black economy since the Suharto era (Peluso 
2009; van Klinken 2008; Davidson 2003).
Communal violence has also beset East Timor, which did 
not become part of Indonesia until 1975 when the Indone-
sian army invaded after Portugal ended its colonial rule. In-
donesia’s occupation generated a vigorous resistance 
movement, Fretilin, and in the following decades, its rule in 
East Timor was characterised by brutal suppression. In 
1998, after Suharto resigned, President Habibie suggested 
that East Timor might be given autonomy. In 1999, the In-
donesian government agreed that a referendum be held to 
choose between autonomy and independence. In the run 
up to the vote in September 1999, militias loyal to Indone-
sia and supported by the Indonesian military provoked 
bloodshed in order to scare the East Timorese into voting 
for autonomy rather than independence (Savage 2002; 
Wheeler and Ddunne 2001; Harper 2005).
Despite this, the referendum showed 78 percent in favour 
of independence. In response, Indonesia loyalists ransacked 
towns and cities and went on a killing spree across the 
country. A UN peacekeeping mission was sent to East 
Timor to stop the violence and put the newly independent 
country on its feet. After East Timor became officially inde-
pendent in 2002, East Timor and Indonesia set up a Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission to investigate the occu-
pation period.
The UN left East Timor in 2005. In 2006, communal viol-
ence broke out and was to last for two years. The violence in-
volved youth gangs, especially in the capital Dili (Goldsmith 
10 The decentralisation process that was initiated 
shortly after Suharto’s resignation has produced the 
problem that local governments all over Indonesia 
are often captured by local elites that are not ac-
countable to the public and are highly corrupt (Mal-
ley 2003).
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2009), former soldiers, and martial arts groups, and exposed 
the fragmented state of East Timor’s social and political 
order after independence (Scambary 2009). The violence 
started as a conflict between the government and sacked sol-
diers but erupted into wider factional violence. Prime Min-
ister Alkatiri of FRETILIN resigned over his inability to 
maintain peace and was succeeded by Jose Ramos-Horta.
Another UN mission was sent to East Timor to stop the vi-
olence. In 2007, in the second parliamentary elections, 
Fretilin won a relative majority in parliament, but could 
not govern alone. Rather than its leader Alkatiri, Xanana 
Gusmão was elected prime minister. Violent protests fol-
lowed this contentious decision, igniting a period of politi-
cal instability. In 2008, Gusmão was shot by rebel soldiers. 
The shot was not lethal, however, and in 2009, twenty-
seven people were tried. The communal violence of 2006 
and the assassination attempt on Gusmão revealed the in-
complete reconciliation processes, ongoing processes of 
nation-building, and conflicting ethnic, social, and political 
identities (Scambary 2009; Kingston 2006).
Three violent episodes of post-colonial East Timorese his-
tory are discussed in the literature: the Indonesian occu-
pation from 1975 to 1999, the violence surrounding the 
1999 referendum, and the violence of 2006. Given that only 
a decade has passed since the vote for independence, most 
studies focus on the question of whether East Timor can 
become a viable state. This is linked with discussions of in-
ternational humanitarian intervention, post-conflict peace-
building and transitional justice (Bain 2003, 140–73).
Some studies in this field discuss the challenges of building 
peace in a politically divided society, particularly when the 
two main security institutions, the Timor-Leste Defence 
Force and the National Police of Timor-Leste are unable to 
cooperate and ridden by factional struggles (Goldsmith 
2009; Lemay-Hebert 2009). Other studies focus on specific 
issues: the origins of the militias that created chaos in East 
Timor in 1999 (Robinson 2001), and the need for recon-
ciliation between the different Timorese factions. Through 
reconciliation political violence can be decreased, the ar-
gument goes. Salla suggests five levels of reconciliation: in-
trapersonal, interpersonal, intergroup, national and 
international (2000). The goal of the reconciliation process 
is the establishment of sustainable institutions of govern-
ance through elite negotiation and social dialogue to trans-
form a society that resorts to violence into one that 
employs peaceful means of conflict settlement (Samuels 
2005). These institutions need to be born out of the con-
text of local institutional and legal traditions in order to be 
sustainable (Salla 2000).
This also holds true for transitional justice, which has to 
take into account the nature of the conflict and local cul-
tures when deciding on the mix of legal instruments to be 
applied during transition periods (Harper 2005). Some 
studies critically examine the work of the hybrid tribunal 
and the Truth Commission that were part of the reconcili-
ation process. Nevins, for example, argues that the Timor-
ese Truth Commission did not achieve much as it focussed 
on individual acts and events of violence rather than on 
systemic forms of violence that include both direct and in-
direct forms as they may be intrinsic in social and econ-
omic systems (Nevins 2003; also Kingston 2006).
In northern Thailand there are conflicts over forest re-
sources between the central government in Bangkok and 
ethnic minorities in the highlands. These include protected 
forests, which have traditionally served as source of liveli-
hood for the local communities. This is therefore a conflict 
of identities between the majority population in the low-
lands and the minorities in the highlands (Wittayapak 
2008). However, this conflict garners little attention. 
Studies on political violence in Thailand focus on the se-
cessionist conflict in the south and the continuing political 
instability following the coup against Thaksin.
Similar conflicts occur in Vietnam between the central gov-
ernment and the ethnic minorities of the Central High-
lands, collectively referred to as Montagnards since French 
colonial times. Ever since they supported the United States 
during the Vietnam War, the central government has viewed 
the Montagnards with suspicion. Violent conflicts occurred 
in 1997/98, 2001 and 2004 over land and religious issues. 
The minorities of the Central Highlands are members of 
small Christian churches – so-called house churches – 
which the Vietnamese government does not recognize. They 
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also claim that they are deprived of their land to make space 
for economic development projects. While no organised 
conflicts have occurred since 2004, arrests are frequent. For 
example, in 2009 at least forty people were arrested in Gia 
Lai province, because they were members of the Dega house 
church (Tin Lanh Dega) (Jones 2002; Jordan 2004; BBC 
News 2004; De Launey 2004).
The Hmong in Laos have faced a similar problem since 
groups of them were recruited into a secret army by the 
CIA during the Vietnam War. While many Hmong left Laos 
after the communist victory in 1975, some of those who 
stayed behind are thought to have fought a low-level war 
against the communist government, which has regarded 
them with suspicion ever since their involvement in the 
U.S. war effort. During the conflict with the Laotian gov-
ernment many Hmong fled to refugee camps on the Thai 
side of the border. In 2009 the Thai government began to 
forcibly repatriate Hmong to Laos (Head 2009; McGeown 
2003; Jinkinson 2004).
While largely free of ethnic violence today, Malaysia does 
have a violent past. Despite the careful creation of an eth-
nically balanced polity under British tutelage, political and 
economic disputes between Singapore and the federal gov-
ernment increased after independence, along with ethnic 
tensions between the Malay majority and Chinese-
dominated Singapore, to such an extent that Singapore was 
expelled from Malaysia in 1965. Singapore henceforth 
prospered under an authoritarian regime that carefully 
managed its ethnic diversity through depoliticisation of 
ethnicity and government (Chua 1995; Means 1998; Vasil 
2000; Lawson 2001; George 2007).
The Malaysian government gave preferential treatment to 
the majority Malay population, the bumiputras, or “sons of 
the soil”, thus preserving Malay political prerogatives from 
the colonial period. While Chinese and Indian immigrants 
were granted citizenship and dominated the economy, Ma-
lays were given control over politics. The trade-off resulted 
in a delicate political balance, which failed during the 1969 
race riots in the face of continued Malay backwardness and 
lack of economic advancement. The affirmative action pro-
gramme introduced in response by the government in 
1971, the New Economic Policy, has since prevented the re-
currence of race riots (Case 2000).11
The situation in Singapore was also ethnically delicate. 
Race riots in 1963 and a social crisis particularly related to 
housing produced an authoritarian turn by the People’s 
Action Party that was directed at depoliticising race. The 
People’s Action Party has since then presided over an auth-
oritarian Singapore and co-opts opposition groups to pre-
empt challenges to its rule (Huff 1995; Hill and Lian 1995; 
Rodan 2004; George 2007).
2.1.3. Neopatrimonialism, Predatory Politics and Elite Political Systems
Cambodia is among the few countries in the region not 
beset by ethnic and religious violence. For political violence 
in Cambodia, two discourses are dominant: the discourse 
on a culture of violence, and the discourse on predatory 
politics. The first argues that three decades of civil war have 
socialised Cambodians into a preference for violent resol-
ution of conflicts. After the civil war, which ended in 1991, 
international organisations working with Cambodian 
NGOs implemented weapons collection programmes. 
However, distrust of fellow-citizens, the security forces and 
the government in a volatile security climate led many to 
secretly keep weapons. The failure of weapons collections 
programmes therefore left an extraordinary number of 
weapons in the hands of ordinary people, who use them to 
settle conflicts with neighbours, family members, and 
others in their community (Huot 2005).
Post-war adversity combined with a weak state and an under-
developed legal culture to produce a high homicide rate, in-
cluding not only political violence but also general mayhem, 
banditry and murder-robbery (Broadhurst 2002). Cambodia 
had to embark on a second nation-building process, because 
the first one that followed decolonisation was aborted when 
Cambodia was drawn into the Vietnam War and its own 
three decades of political conflict (Freistein 2002).
11 For an early report immediately after the 1969 
race riots see Gagliano (1970).
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The end of the civil war in 1991 did not end the political con-
flict. Instead, the major civil war parties struggled for pre-
dominance in the post-war political system. Assassinations 
became a routine means of dealing with political opponents, 
including opposition parties, trade unions, journalists, and 
social activists (Un 2005). Political violence only decreased 
after the post-war power struggle between the major parties 
was resolved in the wake of Hun Sen’s 1997 coup against Ra-
nariddh (Widyono 2008). In the volatile political climate, 
homicide rates reached the post-war rate of 1993 (11.6 per 
100,000), partly brought about by police and mob killings 
that were not investigated by the judiciary (Broadhurst 2002).
A number of studies challenge the culture of violence hy-
pothesis, warning against a culturalism that employs images 
of Oriental despotism and authoritarianism. In reality, 
these authors argue, violent conflict does not emerge be-
cause it is inherent to a particular culture, but because con-
flict is inherent to processes of political and economic 
reform (for example Springer 2009a). In particular, the call 
for marketisation in post-war settings functions as a pretext 
for elites to maintain an authoritarian political system that 
counteracts calls for democratisation for the sake of econ-
omic stability and neo-liberal reforms (Springer 2009b).
Other studies argue that political processes are path-depen-
dent. Cambodian society is organised along patron-client 
lines, so these relations also organise the political system and 
have adapted to the democratic institutions that were intro-
duced after the civil war (Roberts 2002). The present leader-
ship is largely identical to the leadership that came into power 
after the Vietnamese intervention of 1978. Since then, the 
same leadership has managed to stay in power despite a UN 
intervention (1991–1993) that introduced democratic in-
stitutions and a defeat in the first national elections in 1993.
The leadership was able to survive any challenge to its rule 
because it had built up its power base since 1979 by devis-
ing a neopatrimonial polity that exercises leverage over the 
local government level (Pak et al. 2007). All village chiefs 
were put in place by the post-1979 government, thus gener-
ating a viable power resource that democratic institutions 
were unable to challenge. After 1991, this neopatrimonial 
network controlled by the ruling party adjusted to the new 
institutions and provided Hun Sen with the ability to 
politically outmanoeuvre his chief rival Prince Ranariddh.
Since the introduction of multi-party democracy in 1993, 
Cambodia’s polity has been characterised by rival pa-
tronage networks associated with political parties seeking 
political influence. The fact that the post-1993 political 
parties had been adversaries during the civil war resulted in 
widespread political violence, in particular electoral viol-
ence, through until the late 1990s. However, since then 
Hun Sen’s ability to consolidate his power at the expense of 
his political rivals has led to a stark decrease in political vi-
olence (Roberts 2002; Un 2005). The legitimacy of political 
opposition is viewed from this vantage point: political op-
position is seen not as a legitimate institution in the demo-
cratic system of a pluralist society, but as a rival patronage 
network that challenges the power holder’s resource access.
This relates to the second argument of predatory politics, 
which proposes that the Cambodian government has cre-
ated a system of neopatrimonialism in which political and 
economic power are in the same hands, linked by hor-
izontal relationships between the political and economic 
elites. In this system, a dominant group secures access to 
material and immaterial resources: money, land, em-
ployment, education, health care, and natural resources 
such as timber. Vertical patron-client links ensure that the 
government is not accountable to the general public, and 
access to resources is restricted to those who are part of 
these networks (Hadiz 2004; McCulloch 2005; Wong 
2008). Violence occurs when NGOs, individuals or 
members of rival patronage networks attempt to block 
this access, as when activists tried to publicise illegal log-
ging by companies tied to the political and army leader-
ship. They were subsequently shot, while the perpetrators 
escaped justice.12
12 For details on the exploitation of natural re-
sources by the Cambodian elite see Global Witness 
(2007).
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Land disputes are particularly prominent, with national 
newspapers reporting forced evictions on an almost daily 
basis. Forced evictions are the result of companies linked to 
the political elite acquiring valuable real estate for commer-
cial or infrastructure development and in the process evicting 
residents, who rarely have clear legal claims. The land registry 
was destroyed during the Khmer Rouge period and is still 
being reconstituted. Constant changes of formal or informal 
land ownership during the war periods from 1968 to 1991 
have made the situation entirely unclear (Chan Sophal, Tep 
Saravy, and Sarthi Acharya 2001). Farmers and slum resi-
dents in Phnom Penh are therefore easy targets for politically 
well-connected businesses. Violence is frequent in these dis-
putes, mostly involving the use of police and military force by 
the government to remove residents from land. One promi-
nent current case is the ongoing conflict (as of March 2011) 
about the area around Boeung Kak lake in Phnom Penh.
In the Philippines, the political system has been char-
acterised by clan-based patron-client relations since colo-
nial times and is often labelled a predatory state (Quimpo 
2003). Electoral violence is frequent, particularly in the 
south where rival clans employ private armies. In Maguin-
danao, violence broke out in 2009 in a local election con-
flict where a family from the ruling Ampatuan clan ordered 
the massacre of fifty-seven people who chose to support 
their rival. The Ampatuan family was said to have been al-
lied with then President Arroyo, who pumped much 
money into the area, ostensibly for development purposes. 
As in many other parts of the country, this did not alleviate 
poverty at all – except perhaps for the Ampatuan family. In 
response to the massacre Arroyo declared martial law in 
the province, which she lifted again in December 2009. The 
episode shows yet another feature of violence in Mindanao: 
rather than communist-inspired and secessionist, this was 
a local conflict between rival clans (Rushford 2009; Inter-
national Crisis Group 2009, 2010).
In Thailand, a coup of 1946 brought a military regime to 
power. Successive military regimes ruled directly or con-
trolled the government until 1997. By then, fourteen con-
stitutions had been enacted since the abolition of the 
absolute monarchy in 1932. Military control was only in-
terrupted from 1973 to 1976, when the military regime 
collapsed in the face of popular opposition. During this 
period, assassinations by the old elite were a common 
manifestation of political violence, as new groups such as 
farmers emerged as political force and demanded par-
ticipation and land reform (Haberkorn 2009). The mili-
tary took over again in 1976 and has retained a key role in 
the political process ever since. However, it was forced to 
allow more participation by the pluralising Thai society, 
particularly as NGOs began to blossom during the 1980s 
and early 1990s. In 1997, a new constitution came into ef-
fect, the most democratic to date. It was first tested in the 
2001 elections, which brought the entrepreneur Thaksin 
Shinawatra to power, a populist politician with a strong 
base in rural communities and the urban poor. Thaksin 
was controversial in his business dealings, with allegations 
of corruption, but more importantly he was the first 
prime minister not to come from the traditional elite 
around the royal family and the military. This elite viewed 
Thaksin with suspicion (Hewinson 1997; McCargo 2001), 
and the military instigated a coup against him in 2006. 
Since then, Thailand has been in political crisis, with 
Thaksin loyalists and royalists pitted against each other, 
and at times taking to the streets in extended mass pro-
tests. Despite democratisation and decentralisation pro-
cesses, the majority of the Thai population has little or no 
influence on the elite-centred decision-making processes 
(Arghiros 2002).
2.2. Urban Violence
With the exception of political violence, all the forms of vi-
olence discussed in this paper are under-studied, including 
urban violence. Many studies in this field look not at urban 
violence directly but at risk factors that contribute to urban 
insecurity and urban crime. They focus mostly on rising 
inequality and particularly on how segments of the popu-
lation have been marginalised by economic growth. Some 
studies on urban poverty touch on urban violence, but the 
links between urban violence, poverty and poor govern-
ance have not been comprehensively analysed. This gap in 
the literature includes types of violence, reasons for viol-
ence, key actors, and most likely victims (Dwyer 2003).
The reason for this lack of research is that urban violence is 
a relatively recent phenomenon in the region, given the 
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generally low levels of economic development and urban-
isation in all countries except Japan and the Asian Tigers: 
South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. For South 
Korea and Singapore, research looks into the effectiveness 
of pro-poor government policies, such as housing 
(whereby Singapore’s housing policy forms part of the gov-
ernment’s inventory of social control) (Ha 2002; Lee 2008). 
For Japan, studies focus on the fact that despite industrial-
isation crime rates have been declining since World War 
II.13 Japan has also the lowest rate of youth homicide 
worldwide, with 0.4 per 100,000 individuals (UN Habitat 
2007, 65).
In China and Vietnam, where communist policies aimed at 
egalitarian wealth distribution, urban crime has only be-
come prominent since the economic liberalisation pro-
grammes created stark differences in wealth distribution 
during the 1990s. Both countries are in the process of in-
troducing country-wde systems of social welfare, so studies 
on China and Vietnam analyse progress and effects of 
national social welfare systems for the urban poor and 
rural migrants introduced to cope with the potential 
dangers for urban security (Wu 2009; Gao, Garfinkel and 
Zhai 2009; Liu, He and Wu 2008; Wang 2006; Salditt, 
Whiteford and Adema 2008; Liu 2007; Wang, Shi and 
Zheng 2002; Long and Pfau 2009; Isik-Dikmelik 2006; 
Shanks and Turk 2003). In addition, China’s rapid econ-
omic growth has significantly reduced security of housing, 
as forced evictions and insufficient compensation pay-
ments have led to increasing disaffection (UN Habitat 
2007, 314–15).
In many of the less developed countries of the region, 
economic growth has centred on the capital city and a few 
urban centres (the classic examples are Bangkok in Thail-
and and Phnom Penh in Cambodia). Most other areas re-
main dominated by agricultural activity. However, the 
growth of these centres of economic activity has led to an 
increase in certain forms of violence, “from street crime, 
such as muggings, robberies and carjackings, to kidnap-
pings, murder, drug-related violence and organized crime 
conducted by gangs, to assault, sexual violence, and per-
sonal abuse” (Dwyer 2003; see also UN Habitat 2007, 
53–66). According to Gulfer Cezayirli, Senior Urban Devel-
opment Specialist at the Asian Development Bank, an “in-
adequate urban environment and social and economic 
exclusion, coupled with a lack of access to safety services, 
lead to distrust, frustration, and hopelessness, and con-
tribute to circumstances that encourage urban violence” 
(Dwyer 2003; see also UN Habitat 2007, 66–72).
As a consequence, studies focus on developmental issues 
and the inability or unwillingness of the state to provide 
comprehensive welfare programmes owing to clientelistic 
politics. This is the case in the Philippines, where the tradi-
tion of governance allows the elite to pursue predatory 
politics exploiting material and immaterial resources for 
their own benefit (Quimpo 2009). Civil society has little or 
no influence on political decision-making processes, a situ-
ation also observed in Thailand (Piaseu and Mitchell 2004; 
Piaseu, Belza, and Shell-Duncan 2004; Silvey 2001). In 
Cambodia especially, the state has been unwilling to pro-
vide comprehensive welfare: The government, dominated 
since 1979 by the Cambodian People’s Party and Prime 
Minister Hun Sen, is not publicly accountable, because its 
power is generated through patron-client relationships 
with the rural electorate (Roberts 2001). Therefore, when 
the government recognises a potential threat to its rule 
from dissatisfied segments of the population, its strategy is 
to extend control over this group. The government re-
sponded in this manner in 2006, when it passed a military 
service law to place urban youth, who are increasingly 
threatened by unemployment, under governmental surveil-
lance rather than implementing sustainable anti-poverty 
programmes (Hensengerth 2008a).
In Phnom Penh, urban crime is on the rise, and Phnom 
Penh’s residents report crime and violence as their major 
problems (Asian Development Bank 2007, 1). As a con-
sequence of the rise in urban crime, studies examine how 
13 For Japan, studies find that crime rates have de-
clined since World War II despite increased levels of 
industrialisation. See for example Tsushima (1996).
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to reduce crime by fostering social integration through up-
grading infrastructure and access to public services such as 
health care and education (Asian Development Bank 2007, 
1; UN Habitat 2007, 304, 313–14). At the same time, the in-
security of land titles stemming from the civil war period 
has to be clarified in order to put an end to mass evictions 
carried out by the Cambodian regime and companies 
under the protection of the police and the courts (Chan, 
Tep and Acharya 2001).
The most common crimes committed in Phnom Penh are 
robbery, burglary, motorcycle theft, theft of valuables from 
passengers, street fights, physical extortion, and gang rape 
(Asian Development Bank 2007, 2).14 Gang rape is concen-
trated in youth gangs in Phnom Penh, where it forms part 
of a male bonding ritual and hedonistic display of mascu-
linity (Gender and Development for Cambodia 2003). The 
crime hotspots are the quarters with high concentrations of 
squatters, drug addicts, and unemployed, where there are 
also gambling dens and brothels. A corrupt police and 
judicial system contribute to popular perceptions of inse-
curity (Asian Development Bank 2007, 2).
This lack of trust in the criminal justice system is a key fac-
tor in the feeling of insecurity (Asian Development Bank 
2007, 2). This is confirmed by studies on the Cambodian 
governance system, which argue that the Cambodian judici-
ary is not only corrupt but also politically controlled. This 
allows the rich and powerful to evade punishment if they 
belong to the appropriate patronage networks (for example 
Kent 2006). Given that members of the political and econ-
omic elites are engaged in illegal land seizure, illegal logging, 
and extortion from owners of brothels and gambling estab-
lishments, political control of the judiciary serves to ensure 
impunity and a constant cash flow between organised crime 
and members of the ruling elite (Hensengerth 2008a).
2.3. Domestic Violence
Domestic violence is an issue in all countries in the region, 
but has only slowly been acknowledged as a social problem 
in these patriarchal societies. This contrasts starkly with the 
high economic growth rates experienced by many of these 
countries since World War II and the surge in female par-
ticipation in the labour market.
Across the region, research finds a prevalence of shame, se-
crecy, non-intervention, police disinterest, a consequently 
unprepared healthcare system and a connection between 
abuse and mental illness. Studies find that witnessing par-
ental violence, husbands’ unemployment, husbands’ fre-
quent alcohol use, women’s acceptance of a subservient 
role, and lack of money in low-income households are risk 
factors for wife abuse. However, most of these factors were 
also prevalent in high-income households with domestic 
violence (Milwertz 2003; Kyu and Kanai 2005; Phillips et al. 
2006; Yount and Carrera 2006; Aekplakorn and Kongsakon 
2007; Brickell 2008; Ansara and Hindin 2009).15 Violence 
against pregnant women is treated as a separate field of re-
search and focuses on the ill effects on maternal health 
(Sricamsuk 2006). Scholars seeking to generate effective in-
tervention methods distinguish between physical, sexual 
and psychological abuse (Xu et. al. 2005; Yount and Carrera 
2006; Yoshihama et. al. 2007; Nguyen, Ostergren, and 
Krantz 2008; Ansara and Hindin 2009).
Women’s rights discourses in the region are framed with 
reference to international norm frameworks, most import-
antly the UN Declaration of Human Rights, the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, and the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) (Asia 
Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development and 
Women’s Legal Bureau 2007, 8–9, 45).16
The most pervasive issue is the situation of women in conser-
vative, male-dominated societies: They occupy low socio-
economic positions despite playing a major role in food 
production and family care; more women than men are illit-
erate, and fewer are enrolled in educational institutions; and 
14 Asian Development Bank 2007: 2.
15 For a general overview of risk factors see Jewkes 
(2002).
16 For an overview on human rights norms and 
their application to violence against women see 
Walker (1999).
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women are financially dependent on their husbands (Asian 
Population and Development Association and Asian Forum 
of Parliamentarians on Population and Development 2007, 
111–12; Asia Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Devel-
opment and Women’s Legal Bureau 2007, 21–22). This af-
fects societies with conservative Islam in Malaysia, Indonesia 
and minority areas of the Philippines (Hilsdon 2003; Foley 
2003; Asia Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development 
and Women’s Legal Bureau 2007, 21–22), conservative Cath-
olicism in the Philippines (Women’s Legal Bureau 2006, 8 
and 26; Ansara and Hindin 2009), non-religious ideologies 
such as Confucianism in China, Japan, South Korea and Viet-
nam (Yoshihama and Sorensen 1994; Doe 2000; Shirahase 
2001; Yoshihama 2002c; Xu et. al. 2005; Nguyen, Ostergren, 
and Krantz 2008), and in general patriarchal societies such as 
those in Cambodia and Thailand (Yount and Carrera 2006; 
Aekplakorn and Kongsakon 2007; Brickell 2008).
This raises more fundamental questions of social change. 
Since the 1950s, countries in the region have experienced 
the “Asian economic miracle”. Japan was the first country 
to see strong rapid growth. In the 1960s, South Korea, Sin-
gapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong followed as the newly in-
dustrialising economies (NICs) or Asian Tigers. In the 
1980s, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia 
were termed the New Tigers or second-generation NICs. 
This surge in industrialisation precipitated social dif-
ferentiation and an increase in female employment, mostly 
in clerical jobs and light manufacturing such as textiles 
(Shirahase 2001).17 But social change has not always altered 
traditional views on gender (Truong 1999).18 Instead, it has 
led to new conflicts as women became empowered through 
wage-earning and better education, leading to a loss of (or 
a threat to) male identity.
The issue of female subjugation in Muslim societies inter-
sects with the issue of political violence, but is discussed 
here with reference to women’s rights. Indonesia is one ex-
ample, where the introduction of an anti-pornography law 
shows the great influence of conservative Muslim groups 
on politics, despite the liberal views of President Yudhoyo-
no and the majority of Indonesian Muslims. The extent to 
which this can be regarded as a concession to the streng-
thening of conservative Islam in local governments since 
the start of decentralisation programmes can be debated 
(Hadiz 2004; Erb, Sulistiyanto, and Faucher 2005; Sherlock 
2005; Drexler 2006; Chauvel 2006; van Klinken 2007; 
Hainsworth 2007; Miller 2009).
Indonesia has seen a variety of Muslim organisations that 
cover the spectrum from non-violence to militancy. The 
latter is usually associated with the Indonesian terror net-
work Jemaah Islamiah. Major terrorist attacks were carried 
out in Bali (in 2002 and 2005) and in Jakarta (Marriott 
Hotel in 2003, Australian Embassy in 2004, and the Mar-
riott and Ritz-Carlton Hotels in 2009) (Desker 2003; Liow 
2004; Jones 2005; Hamilton-Hart 2005; Cady and Simon 
(eds.) 2006; Park and Niyozov 2008; Sidel 2008; Aljunied 
2009).19 Yet, there are other radical Muslim groups in In-
donesia that have only recently been influenced by trans-
national Islamist networks and whose origin can be traced 
back to the 1940s (van Bruinessen 2002).
Aceh, on the northern tip of Sumatra island, was first 
allowed to institute Sharia law in 2001 as part of a peace 
deal with the Jakarta government. After becoming auton-
omous in 2005, Aceh’s government put more stipulations 
of Sharia law into effect. While at first this involved less 
controversial passages, in September 2009 Aceh’s parlia-
ment legislated stoning as punishment for adultery (BBC 
News 2009).
A similar strengthening of conservative Islam can be ob-
served in Malaysia. However, this is mostly superficial as 
the government has employed a deliberate strategy of co-
opting conservative groups in order to fend off challenges 
by more radical Muslim groups and accusations by funda-
mentalists that Malaysia is not sufficiently Islamic. In con-
junction with the government’s moderate stance, such a 
policy also protects the economically important Indian and 
17 For an overview of the social effects of economic 
restructuring particularly after the Asian financial 
crisis see Deyo and Agartan (2003); Lee (2006).
18 Truong presents further detailed analyses of the 
effects of economic growth on gender practices in the 
workplace, e.g. the introduction of childcare facilities.
19 For a non-violent radical Islamist group in In-
donesia, the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, see Ward 
(2009).
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Chinese minorities.20 Despite the government’s efforts to 
forestall the advance of radical groups, Malaysia made 
headlines when a court ordered the whipping of a woman 
who had drunk beer in public (the punishment was de-
ferred after widespread protests) (Fuller 2009).
In order to combat the subjugation of women and their ex-
posure to abuse in the family, women’s rights NGOs have 
formed regional networks to advocate for women’s edu-
cation, raise their awareness about their rights under inter-
national human rights treaties and change traditions that 
have a preference for boys over girls. For this to occur, they 
believe that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
must be lobbied for the protection of human rights; gov-
ernments must be lobbied to implement the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child; an 
independent body to document human rights violations 
must be established; legal changes must be advanced 
through legislation and judicial practice; networks joining 
affected women must be created; and activists must engage 
with the younger generation to institute generational 
change (Asian Population and Development Association 
and Asian Forum of Parliamentarians on Population and 
Development 2007, 113–14; Asian Forum of Parliamentar-
ians on Population and Development 2001; Asia Pacific 
Forum on Women, Law and Development and Women’s 
Legal Bureau 2007, 29–30, 45–46). More specific sugges-
tions include the application of the due diligence principle, 
the precondition of which is transparency and ac-
countability of government and security forces (Pusey 
2008).
Importantly, the measures suggested here go beyond legal 
rights derived from international frameworks, and do more 
than request governments to pass appropriate legislation. 
They aim to bring about a profound socio-cultural change 
in the role of women in traditional societies by using 
proactive and strategic approaches rather than only for-
malistic legal instruments (Hebert 2008).
The application of international norms is also a key point 
in country analyses. In China, feminist activists have gener-
ated new knowledge drawn from international discourses 
on women’s rights to form an epistemic community that 
subscribes to global norms in order to overcome local no-
tions of masculinity (Milwertz and Bu 2007). Women’s 
rights have a history in China, beginning with marriage re-
form under the communist government after 1949 and fe-
male leadership of paramilitary groups at the height of the 
Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1967. Still, however, this 
has not changed the basic patterns of male domination of 
the household, given that Confucian principles of family 
organisation survived both the 1949 revolution and the 
Cultural Revolution (Milwertz 2003; Xu et. al. 2005). The 
economic reforms introduced after 1978 did little to change 
this, as men continue to be seen as those who uphold the 
family line (Women’s Feature Service 2004; Milwertz 
2003). Traditional attitudes toward gender relations and the 
justification of wife-beating are associated with a higher 
risk of exposure to domestic violence (Xu et. al. 2005).
The problem begins at birth, with boys being assigned 
higher value than girls. Currently China is experiencing a 
shortage of girls, and treatment of women may improve. 
However, better treatment does not automatically increase 
women’s autonomy, as their subordinate position in the 
family may stay the same (Das Gupta and Li 1999). The 
Chinese Communist Party has been trying to counteract 
this trend by instituting rule of law in marriage policy to 
supersede traditional notions of masculinity and gender 
dominance. The latest amendment of the Marriage Law in 
2001 enhanced the protection of women against domestic 
violence (Zhang 2002). However, the weakness of legal in-
tervention in China is implementation. Another problem is 
the patriarchal political system that rarely allows women to 
rise to top positions in politics. Since the reform process in 
the late 1970s, the only woman who has attained a leading 
position was Wu Yi, who was Vice Premier between 2003 
and 2007 and Acting First Vice Premier between 2007 and 
2008.21
20 On the political situation of Islam in Malaysia 
see Haneef (2001), Liow (2004), Thirkell-White 
(2006), Liwo (2009), and Julian C. H. Lee (2010).
21 For statistics on China see for example Parish et. 
al. (2004) and Xu et. al. (2005).
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Hong Kong also struggles with a high incidence of wife 
abuse. While the practice is to jail wife abusers, there is ad-
vocacy for court-mandated counselling, a practice tested in 
China and Taiwan. The idea is to begin a learning process 
that encourages non-violent settlement of household con-
flicts. Court-mandated counselling, it is argued, should en-
gage the local cultural discourse on masculinities rather 
than attempting to impose a system that carries notions of 
British culture and is detached from Confucian family 
tradition (Chiu 2001).
In South Korea, “patriarchal social values . . . had tradi-
tional primacy over family members’ human rights” with 
the result that “husbands often physically abused their 
wives in the name of maintaining hierarchical order in the 
family” (Doe 2000, 234). However, the recognition of do-
mestic violence as a social problem led to the passing of the 
Law for Preventing Domestic Violence in 1997 (Doe 2000, 
234). In contrast to this, the Basic Act on Healthy Family of 
2004 is seen as a reaction to women’s increased par-
ticipation in the labour force, decline in fertility rates and 
increased rates of divorce. Direct government interference 
in family life is seen especially by feminist scholars as a 
reaction to this “crisis”, and an attempt to cement women’s 
subservient status in male-dominated Korean society and 
their secondary status in the labour force (Park 2005).
Japan also has a history of domestic violence, stemming 
from the patriarchal social structure and an emphasis on 
shame rather than justice. Research into the issue is exam-
ining the evolving social and policy frameworks that at-
tempt to help abused women. With abuse long having been 
considered a private matter, official assistance programmes, 
police protection and political initiatives are still evolving. 
Family, friends and professionals often blame the victim, 
making it difficult to escape from physical violence and 
break out of the social isolation imposed by the husband 
(Yoshihama 2002a; Nayak et al. 2003).
Shirahase reports that even working women often perceive 
their status as depending on their husband’s work. This 
supports gender asymmetries, which prevail despite the 
sharp increase in the number of women in the labour force 
caused by Japanese economic growth after World War II 
(Shirahase 2001).22
Grassroots organisations were the first to take up the issue, 
helping women to break out of their isolation (Yoshihama 
2002a; Nayak et al. 2003). According to Yoshihama (2002c, 
345), domestic violence has been recognised as a social 
problem only since 1992 when a national survey revealed 
that domestic violence occurred frequently and was not 
treated as a criminal matter, but as a quarrel between a 
married couple. Mediators at family courts tended to tell 
women to accept their subordinate status, thus imposing 
conservative norms.
The 1992 study helped domestic grassroots organisations 
take the issue to the international level. At the World Con-
ference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993 a workshop on 
violence against Asia Pacific women was held in cooperation 
with the Asian Women’s Human Rights Council. In ad-
dition, the UN Conference on Women in Beijing generated 
publicity across the region (Yoshihama 2002c, 351 and 355).
Japan’s social and political climate slowly improved since 
then, encouraging medical research into the connection be-
tween depression and anxiety in women and physical, sex-
ual, and psychological abuse at home. This, it is hoped, will 
assist the development of medical care for victims and in-
form the political process to ensure better legal protection 
and healthcare systems for women (Weingourt et al. 2001; 
Yoshihama 2002b).
In Vietnam, domestic abuse of women is associated with 
mental health problems that meet an unprepared health 
care system and a lack of policy initiatives. Violence against 
women is treated as a private matter, and a culture of 
shame and the prevalence of traditional gender roles often 
discourages women from revealing their abuse and seeking 
help (Vung, Ostergren, and Krantz 2009; Jonzon et al. 
2007). Patriarchal family norms and traditional gender 
22 Shirahase’s data are based on the 1995 Japanese 
Social Stratification and Mobility Survey.
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norms “continue to prevail” even though “more than 70 
percent of women of working age (16–55) participate in 
the labour market and women constitute 52 percent of the 
total workforce” (Nguyen, Ostergren, and Krantz 2008), 
and despite the fact that – like China – Vietnam experi-
enced socialist revolution and embarked on an economic 
reform programme in 1986.
In Thailand, the Domestic Violence Act of 2007 has not yet 
improved the situation: it encourages reconciliation; police 
officers still turn women away saying that domestic viol-
ence is a private problem; and medical staff in the One 
Stop Crisis Centers of the Public Health Ministry are not 
sensitive to gender-specific problems (IRIN News 2008). 
Most women who seek help turn to friends or family 
members and only rarely to the police and the courts (In-
stitute of Population and Social Research at Mahidol Uni-
versity and Foundation for Women 2003). While some 
studies of high- and low-income families find no sig-
nificant difference in the frequency of domestic violence 
incidents (Hindin and Adair 2002; The Nation 2006), 
others associate low income, poor education and low occu-
pational status with higher risks of domestic violence 
(Hoffman, Demo, and Edwards 1995).
For Cambodia, studies find that a lack of economic re-
sources in the family (such as financial problems due to un-
employment) and the resulting frustration and alcohol 
abuse increase the risk of violence (Zimmerman 1994; Yount 
and Carrera 2006; Brickell 2008). Women’s economic de-
pendence on their husbands also makes them more tolerant 
of partner abuse and exposes them to a higher risk of abuse 
(Yount and Carrera 2006). A woman who has experienced 
violence between her parents during childhood is more 
likely to end up with a violent husband through a process of 
mate selection, although she is not more likely to accept 
partner violence as being justified (Yount and Carrera 2006). 
This shows the importance of family resources and child-
hood experience of violence between parents as an import-
ant factor for domestic violence (Yount and Carrera 2006).
Similar to Thailand, the Cambodian justice system also en-
courages reconciliation. Violence against women is the re-
sult of traditional roles in a hierarchically ordered society 
in which women have to obey the husband and are often 
severely beaten for trivialities. Cambodian judges tend to 
see wife abuse as a criminal act only if the victim is 
“stabbed, shot, unconscious or dead” (Zimmerman 1994). 
While men maintained their traditional role of authority in 
the family, expecting women to remain obedient and sex-
ually available (Surtees 2003, 97, citing Dworkin 1997, 
120), post-war employment in industry, particularly in tex-
tiles, often favoured women, thus upsetting traditional 
gender roles. Sexual and physical violence in the family en-
gender shame, while friends, family and neighbours ask the 
victim to remain quiet so as not to worsen the situation. 
Attempts are made to overcome these attitudes by forging 
partnerships and running awareness-raising campaigns 
with local police and communities (Spindel, Levy, and 
Connor 2000, 57–69).
In Indonesia, the government long denied that violence 
against women was a problem on a mass scale. However, 
the mass rape of Chinese Indonesian and other ethnic mi-
nority women in the May 1998 riots forced the government 
to acknowledge the scale of the problem. The issue of mass 
rape of Chinese women is discussed in the broader frame-
work of masculinity and sexual violence in Indonesia 
(Strassler 2004). In response to the crisis, the government 
established the National Commission on Violence Against 
Women (Komisi Nasional Anti Kekerasan Terhadap Per-
empuan, KNAKTP). The move was heralded as a major 
policy step, but concrete outcomes are lacking (Wandita 
1998; Budianta 2000; Tan 2006).23
In Singapore, police have been slow to respond to marital 
violence, despite legal reform. The problem here is to be 
found in police subcultures and the conditions under 
which the Singaporean police force operates. The issue is 
therefore not so much legal change, but the organisational 
response of the police force (Ganapathy 2002, 2006, 2008).
23 See also UNIFEM’s annotated list of Indonesian 
women’s NGOs at http://www.unifem-eseasia.org/
projects/evaw/vawngo/vamindo.htm. .
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A study on domestic violence in the Philippines reports 
that regular church attendance in the Roman Catholic 
country is associated with a lower risk of domestic violence 
(Ansara and Hindin 2009). The same study found that 
women were just as likely as men to perpetrate aggression 
against their spouse. However, women are more likely to 
need medical attention, and women are frequently sub-
jected to sexual coercion. Thus, forms of violence (psycho-
logical, physical and sexual abuse) vary between genders 
while frequency does not. Church attendance especially by 
both partners is a cultural factor that appears to lower the 
risk of violence perpetration (Ansara and Hindin 2009). A 
study on intergenerational transmission of partner viol-
ence in Cebu found an association with the experience of 
interparental violence by at least one of the partners (Fehr-
inger and Hindin 2009).
Studies on Thailand found that women were as much sub-
ject to physical and psychological abuse in low-income 
families where violence is often about money problems, as 
they were in high-income families where women pursue an 
independent career (Hindin and Adair 2002; The Nation 
2006). It was found that patterns of household decision-
making are a better predictor of violence than income and 
employment status: Men are more likely to use violence 
when they dominate household decisions. Women who 
dominate household decisions are also more likely to ex-
perience violence. Men are most likely to refrain from viol-
ence in households where decisions are made jointly by 
husband and wife (Hindin and Adair 2002).
In contrast to the above studies, the domestic violence dis-
course in East Timor is part of the peace-building process 
initiated after the violent excesses surrounding the 1999 in-
dependence referendum. Here, the argument is that the de-
mocratic opening and the high international profile during 
the 1999 referendum brought international norms that are 
being internalised in the peace-building process and are 
used by women’s NGOs to promote awareness-raising cam-
paigns that aim to empower women in the new democratic 
spaces (Hall 2009). However, a quantitative study compar-
ing the pre-1999 and post-1999 situation argues that the 
incidence of intimate partner violence against women has 
not declined since the crisis, although there is a significant 
decline in sexual and physical assaults against women by 
perpetrators outside the family (Hynes et al. 2004). These 
findings are partly corroborated by Simião, who argues that 
the modernisation process and the fight against domestic 
violence in East Timor require an understanding of the dif-
ferent meanings of violence, body and gender that com-
plicate the current processes of reform (2006).
2.4. Youth Violence
Like domestic violence, youth violence can partly be seen 
as a result of social change. Youth violence is the most ne-
glected of the four forms of violence discussed in this 
study, and research is rare. To some extent, this may reflect 
widely held beliefs that youth in Northeast and Southeast 
Asia, are well controlled and integrated into rigorous pub-
lic and private institutions of social control, such as schools 
and families.24 Psychologists, particularly in Japan and Sin-
gapore where the profession is well developed, challenge 
this assumption, and it is psychologists rather than social 
scientists who also appear more likely to investigate the 
issue of youth violence in their respective countries. 
Studies on youth violence in the region all agree that youth 
gangs form as self-help systems, resulting from various 
forms of social exclusion in paternalistic societies.
The issue of attaining visibility through gangs is tied to the 
question of social change – urbanisation, globalisation, mi-
gration, and economic structures shifting away from an ag-
rarian economy (Hensengerth 2008b; Roeske 2006, 6–17). 
In such a situation young people are caught between tradi-
tion and modernity. Their transition from childhood to 
adulthood is made more difficult by having to negotiate 
their parents’ values with a new youth culture that uses 
symbols of consumption such as pop music, mobile phones 
or motorbikes. In authoritarian societies, the emergence of 
this new social group may contrast with the “exclusion of 
the young from national economies” (Comaroff and Co-
maroff 2005; Milnitsky 2006, 196–97; Gender and Devel-
24 Confidental interview in Phnom Penh, 31 May 
2007.
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opment for Cambodia 2003, part 3). The rise of youth as a 
new consumer group with distinct lifestyles has produced 
new identities, leading to conflicts with teachers and par-
ents as traditional patterns of interaction lose their value 
within the new group (Gender and Development for Cam-
bodia 2003, part 3; Roeske 2002, 6; Milnitsky 2006, 203).
In Cambodia, youth gangs form as systems of self-help in a 
society that is paternalistic and structured by patron-client 
relations. In this system, youth have no opportunities to 
partake in political decision-making. Although the system 
is formally a democracy, political processes cannot be in-
fluenced by the public and are controlled instead by the 
political and economic elite through a system of neop-
atrimonialism. Economic growth rests on three pillars, tex-
tiles, construction and tourism, and is geographically 
concentrated on the capital Phnom Penh, the port city of 
Sihanoukville, and the tourism centre of Siem Reap. The 
rest of the country remains largely untouched.
With the formal economy so small, many young people 
migrate to Phnom Penh to work in the textile industry, or 
they have to seek employment in the informal economy. 
Once in Phnom Penh, rural youth are often picked up by 
one of the gangs. These gangs are usually led by children of 
the political, economic, or military elites and are therefore 
immune from prosecution. In turn, they may be func-
tionalised by these elites for acts of violence against the op-
position (Hinton 2006). The gangs provide access to jobs, 
education, and healthcare for their poorer members, ar-
ranged by the gang leader who enjoys access to these re-
sources owing to his influential family background. The 
gang leader therefore occupies the position of patron, the 
members further down the internal hierarchy are his 
clients. As a result, Cambodian gangs adopt the patron-
client structure of Cambodian society (Gender and Devel-
opment for Cambodia 2003; Hensengerth 2008a; Ministry 
of Social Affairs, Labor, Vocational Training and Youth Re-
habilitation 2002, 38–39).
The origins of Cambodian youth gangs lie in the low levels of 
human development after the civil war. The Ministry of So-
cial Affairs, Labor, Vocational Training and Youth Rehabili-
tation reports that after the war, many children were left to 
live by themselves and had to find their own food. Dys-
functional families and domestic violence led children to run 
away from home and live on the streets. Juvenile delinquency 
and the formation of youth gangs in the cities emerged as a 
new phenomenon. Crimes committed by youth include theft, 
robbery, and drug use (Ministry of Social Affairs, Labor, 
Vocational Training and Youth Rehabilitation 2002, 37–38).
The situation is unchanged today, with a government that is 
not accountable to the general public having failed to pro-
vide national social security systems in almost two decades 
of post-civil-war development. Youth are also disenfran-
chised, as they have no influence on political processes. In-
stead, the approach to integrating delinquent youth is 
authoritarian and follows the patronage approach. The mili-
tary service law passed in 2006 is such a tool, aimed at inte-
grating a potentially destabilising and critical social group 
into the neopatrimonial system (Hensengerth 2008a).
In Singapore, too, adolescents join gangs to achieve social 
visibility and status. However, rather than coming from 
families were they are abused or where the parents are un-
involved in their children’s lives, Singaporean youth tend to 
join gangs from families in which the mother is “over-pro-
tective, over-controlling, critical, guilt-inducing” (Kee et. al. 
2003). Gang youth have lower self-esteem and higher levels of 
aggression than peers who do not join gangs (Kee et al. 2003). 
As to the question of why youth violence occurs in a highly 
collectivised society such as Singapore, Lim and Chang argue 
that collective self-esteem is a factor in the execution of viol-
ence (2007). The key factor is allocentrism, the social ob-
ligation to the ingroup, particularly when the ingroup 
advocates violence. This tendency of collectivism in relation 
to the ingroup is in line with the demands of a collectivist so-
ciety and explains how youth violence may become a phe-
nomenon in such societies (Lim and Chang 2007).
A second strand of Singaporean youth gang research deals 
with minority street corner gangs, which often consist of 
lower class Tamils who are seen as a threat by the police be-
cause of their potential to upset the relationship between 
the police and Chinese secret societies. The police enlist the 
help of secret society members to keep the peace in areas 
the police cannot effectively control: prostitution, illegal 
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moneylending, coffee shop owners, hawkers, newspaper 
vendors, contractors, and massage parlours and karaoke 
bars. In return, the secret society in the area gains control 
over the territory and its legal and illegal economic ac-
tivities. Tamil street corner gangs are viewed by the police 
as upsetting this relationship when they try to gain a foot-
hold in the criminal underworld. Gangs comprised of 
working class Tamils therefore experience failure not only 
in the legitimate Singaporean society, but also in the 
underworld scene (Ganapathy and Lian 2002).
In Japan, youth violence has traditionally been discussed in 
terms of violence against family members, so research fo-
cuses on individual acts of violence rather than youth 
gangs. But individual youth violence has only attracted in-
creased attention in the last ten years as juvenile delinquen-
cy has risen. The crimes range from general anti-social 
behaviour to sexual offences and murder. This is especially 
the case for violence in schools, where pressure exerted by 
parents often causes frustration even among students with 
good results. These children and adolescents often have no 
history of crime; their delinquency appears suddenly with 
the development path leading to the violent act undetected. 
School bullying and pervasive developmental disorder are 
among the risk factors frequently cited by psychologists. 
But the justice system and popular opinion are geared to-
wards stricter punishment rather than treatment and pre-
vention of mental problems (Ono and Pumariega 2008; 
also Hayes and Kameguchi 2005).
In China, research focuses on youth gangs. By the point 
when they are picked up by the police, youth in gangs al-
ready have a history of violence. The organisational level of 
youth gangs is low, however. Gangs are often composed of 
fellow workers or people that originated from the same 
geographical area. So gangs are based on the traditional so-
cial organising principles of work unit and interpersonal 
relationships defined by area of origin. The reaction of the 
Chinese state is similar to the reactions in other countries 
in the region: the administration of severe punishment 
(Zhang et al. 1997; Zhang and Liu 2007; Zhang 2008).
Like the domestic violence discourse, discussion links youth 
violence in East Timor to the events following independence. 
Adolescents were prominently involved in the communal vi-
olence of 2006 to 2008. They were organised in rival martial 
arts groups (which date back to Portuguese colonialism and 
Indonesian rule and linked up with the factionalised security 
forces after independence); ethnicity-based gangs fighting 
for economic control; gangs led by resistance figures with 
loyalties to different political parties and military factions 
(whose antipathy dates back to the anti-Indonesian resist-
ance); and diverse disenfranchised groups led by ex-com-
batants, opposition politicians, former militia members, and 
unemployed youth who migrated from the rural areas to Dili 
and feel socially, politically and economically excluded. Of all 
these groups, it was the marginalised youth who caused most 
of the violence (Scambary 2006, 2009; Arnold 2009). The di-
versity of groups shows not only the complexity of East Tim-
orese society (Scambary 2009), but also the detachment of 
youth from the solidarity of the resistance era and a process 
in which youth are disenfranchised from political decision-
making processes that are controlled by members of the 
former resistance (Arnold 2009).
3. Conclusion
Patterns of political violence hinge at least partly on colo-
nial experiences: minority problems caused by colonial-era 
frontiers, and, tied to this, the creation of a nation-state 
ideal where ethnic majorities dominate central government 
and attempted to subjugate ethnic minorities into a cen-
tralised state. Colonialism also created new social classes, 
ultimately triggering ideological conflicts between capital-
ism and communism in East Asia.
Post-war economic growth increased social differentiation 
and female participation in the workforce, leading to conflicts 
between modern and traditional gender attitudes. A focus on 
shame, privacy, reconciliation in the legal system and tradi-
tional gender roles clashes with ideas of women’s rights, thus 
trapping women between tradition and modernity.
In lockstep with economic modernisation, globalisation 
has created new patterns of consumption that lead to gen-
erational conflicts. New youth cultures emphasise new 
symbols of identification that deviate from social values of 
hierarchy and obedience in paternalistic societies. One way 
out for youth is the formation of gangs in order to achieve 
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social visibility and to gain access to jobs and services that 
are otherwise unavailable – be it because an elite political 
system blocks access or because of a general lack of re-
sources after war.
In contrast to the above types of violence, urban violence is 
often addressed indirectly by studying poverty or economic 
marginalisation as risk factors that emerge during urban-
isation. Urban insecurity and urban crime are the focus of 
this research, along with rising inequality, marginalisation 
and deprivation. In this sense, urban crime is linked to cer-
tain forms of youth violence where gang violence emerges 
from slum quarters. Here, violence and deprivation are 
linked and demand strategies of social integration.
Regarding the thrust of violence research, youth and urban 
violence are the least well-researched forms in East Asia. 
The goal of coordinated violence research must therefore 
be to strengthen research on the emergence and forms of 
youth and urban violence. This should include suggestions 
for sustainable strategies of youth integration and exit stra-
tegies for adolescents.
To achieve this, existing strands of research scattered across 
disciplines and themes (such as urbanisation, deprivation, 
youth gangs and social exclusion) should be drawn to-
gether in order to gain a clearer picture of causes and links 
between urban violence (including its subtypes), poverty, 
violent actors and victims.
Such an endeavour could enlist the expertise of interested 
international organisations and donor agencies. Cooper-
ation of this kind could help not only to research causes 
and forms of violence, but also to assist in devising stra-
tegies for minimising violence.
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